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I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay examines the trailblazing approach to communal property in the Inter-
American human rights system, and then applies that legal framework to the 
distressing Nicaraguan initiative to construct a trans-oceanic canal. The estimated 
$50 billion megaproject started initial development in December of 2014, and 
seriously threatens the lands and livelihoods of the indigenous and Afro-
Caribbean communities in its path. I conclude that, if Nicaragua proceeds with 
the Canal and several of its associated projects, the State will violate the 
communities’ property rights, among other rights and freedoms. As a result, 
Nicaragua, in accord with its international legal obligations, should halt the Canal 
initiative until it secures the free, prior, and informed consent of the affected 
populations. 
II. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN THE INTER-AMERICAN  
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
The American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) is the 
Western Hemisphere’s primary human rights treaty. It has been acceded to or 
ratified by twenty-three States in the Americas, including Nicaragua.1 The 
Convention’s Article 21 provides, in part: 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. My International Human Rights Clinic 
has joined with indigenous rights advocates in Nicaragua to challenge the Canal before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. Note that brief parts of this essay were adapted from my upcoming book with 
Alejandra Gonza, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS (forthcoming 2016). 
1. American Convention on Human Rights, Signatories and Ratifications, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
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1.  Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The 
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of 
society. 
2.  No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just 
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in 
the cases and according to the forms established by law.2 
While Article 21 was very contested and almost eliminated during the 
Convention’s drafting process, the provision endured and now stands as one of 
the strongest and most detailed expressions of an international right to property. 
Due to the ideological disputes of the Cold War, neither the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, nor the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights provide for the right to property.3 The 
First Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms formulates a more constrained right than Article 21 
of the American Convention.4 Like the European Protocol, both the African5 and 
Arab Charters6 establish property rights—to a greater or lesser degree—but they 
all omit an express right to compensation when the owner is deprived of 
property. 
Particularly in this sense, then, the American Convention provides a stronger 
formulation of the right. Among other protections, it requires “just 
compensation” upon deprivation of property.7 The EU Charter of Fundamental 
 
2. Id.  
3. Of course, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established the right to property. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
4. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 1, 
Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262. 
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one 
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it 
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties. 
Id.  
5. The African Charter establishes: “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate laws.” African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 14, June 27, 1981, 21 
I.L.M. 58. 
6. “Everyone has a guaranteed right to own private property, and shall not under any circumstances be 
arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part of his property.” Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 31, 
May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893 (2005), available at http://www.cartercenter. 
org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/revised_Arab_charter_human_rights.pdf (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
7. American Convention, supra note 1, at art. 21.  
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Rights takes this guarantee a step further: if one is “deprived of his or her 
possessions,” then “fair compensation” must be paid “in good time.”8 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights renders the authoritative 
interpretations of the American Convention. It has taken Article 21’s broad terms 
and developed an expansive notion of property, including communal and private 
property.9 The Inter-American concept encompasses tangible and intangible 
property: “all movable and immovable property, corporeal and incorporeal 
elements, and any other immaterial object that may have a value.”10 
The Inter-American system has seen increasing numbers of cases where 
States and private companies have sought to extract natural resources or develop 
commercial projects on communal lands.11 In 2001, the Court issued its first 
judgment on indigenous land rights, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua.12 Awas Tingni’s ruling on an indigenous right to communal property 
was a first for an international human rights court.13 Beginning with this 
judgment, the Court recognized “the unique and enduring ties that bind 
indigenous communities to their ancestral territory.”14 According to the Court, 
 
8. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 17, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83). 
9. According to the Inter-American Court, corporations possess property rights, but these rights are only 
relevant to the extent that they “encompass” human rights, such as a shareholder’s right to property. See, e.g., 
Perozo v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 195, ¶¶ 399–400 (Jan. 28, 2009). 
10. E.g., Memoli v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 265, ¶ 170 (Aug. 22, 2013); Ivcher-Bronstein v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, ¶ 122 (Feb. 6, 2001).  
11. In addition to the judgments discussed, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has dealt 
with such cases on several occasions. For example, in 2011, the Commission ordered Brazil to halt construction 
on the Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant, a large initiative that endangered indigenous communities of the 
Xingu River Basin in Pará, Brazil. Precautionary Measure 382/10: Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River 
Basin, Pará, Brazil, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Annual Report, OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 69  (2011), available at 
www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). For 
more Commission jurisprudence on the topic, see Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over Their Ancestral 
Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II., doc. 56/09 ¶ 74 (2009), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/ 
indigenous/docs/pdf/AncestralLands.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 
(Aug. 31, 2001). 
13. The African Human Rights Courts were not yet in operation, and the European Court of Human 
Rights still has not rendered a comparable interpretation. The non-binding Human Rights Committee, for its 
part, does not even have competence to find violations of the right to property, because property was omitted 
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Internation Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. For more commentary on Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. 
Nicaragua, see S. James Anaya & Maia S. Campbell, Gaining Legal Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights: 
The Story of the Awas Tingni Case in Nicaragua, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 117 (Deena R. 
Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009); S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
1 (2002). 
14. Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 131 (June 15, 2005); Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 
149. 
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such a people’s relationship to traditional lands should be understood as “the 
fundamental basis of its culture, spiritual life, integrity, and economic survival.”15 
In Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court decided that the N’djuka 
community, a non-native population of African descent, possessed a similar 
relationship with its lands.16 Although the community had only lived in Moiwana 
Village for a century, the Court found a significant spiritual and cultural nexus to 
the territory—describing the connection as “all-encompassing.”17 Consequently, 
the Court concluded that, despite lacking an official title to its lands, the 
community’s ownership was nevertheless protected by Article 21. 
In the Inter-American system, then, if communities have occupied their lands 
“in accordance with customary practices,” they are generally entitled to official 
recognition of their ownership rights.18 The Court is receptive to such claims of 
“traditional” occupation. By requiring communities to follow a “cultural script,” 
however, the Court’s approach limits the autonomy of indigenous peoples and 
their capacity for change.19 Petitioners have satisfied the Court’s standard by 
submitting the testimony of community members themselves, as well as reports 
by anthropologists and other experts. 
Once this standard is deemed fulfilled, the Court orders States, where 
applicable, to delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title over the territories in 
question within a reasonable amount of time.20 When necessary, States are 
required to amend relevant domestic legislation and policy in order to ensure 
 
15. Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 149. 
16. Moiwana Community, supra note 14, at ¶ 133. For other Court judgments protecting the collective 
land rights of Afro-Latin populations, see e.g. Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced From the Cacarica 
River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶ 353 (Nov. 20, 2013); Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 86 
(Nov. 28, 2007).  
17. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 86. 
18. E.g., Moiwana Community, supra note 14, at ¶13, 1; Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 93 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community, the Court utilized four factors to assess the “traditional character” of 
the lands in question: “a) the Community’s occupation and trajectory of the land and its surrounding areas; b) 
the toponymy of the area; c) technical studies prepared on the matter, and d) the alleged suitability of the land 
being claimed.” Id.  
19. See RICHARD PRICE, RAINFOREST WARRIORS: HUMAN RIGHTS ON TRIAL 238–39 (2011) (finding 
Saramaka’s requirement that natural resources must be “traditionally used” for Article 21 protections to be 
“disturbingly essentialist”); Ariel E. Dulitzky, When Afro-Descendants Became “Tribal Peoples”: The Inter-
American Human Rights System and Rural Black Communities, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29, 42 
(2010) (explaining that to obtain property protection, groups are pressured to show the Court an “essentialized 
and frozen culture”); KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, 
CULTURE, STRATEGY 162–82 (2010). 
20. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandi and 
Embera Indigenous People of Bayano and their Members v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
284, ¶ 117, 134, 232 (Oct. 14, 2014). 
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such communal rights to land.21 Until these measures are adopted, the Court 
often forbids States, “or third parties acting with [their] acquiescence or 
tolerance,” from engaging in acts that would affect the ancestral lands in any 
way.22 
In these cases, the Court has required restrictions on property rights to be: 1) 
previously established by law; 2) necessary; 3) proportional; and 4) with the aim 
of achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society.23 Furthermore, the 
measure cannot constitute “a denial of [the community’s] traditions and customs 
in a way that endangers the very survival of the group and of its members.”24 
According to Saramaka People v. Suriname, in order to ensure that 
concessions do not comprise a “denial of their traditions and customs,” States 
must comply with three “safeguards.”25 First, the State must ensure “the effective 
participation of the [community], in conformity with their customs and traditions, 
regarding any development, investment, exploration or extraction plan” within 
the territory.26 Second, the State must guarantee that the community will receive 
“a reasonable benefit” from any such project.27 Third, the State must prevent 
concessions “unless and until independent and technically capable entities, with 
the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and social impact 
assessment.”28 
To ensure “effective” and “meaningful” participation, the Court has held that 
States have “a duty to actively consult” with the community, which requires 
“good-faith” efforts starting at the “early stages” of a development plan.29 Any 
possible environmental or health risks must be communicated promptly to the 
community.30 The consultations “should take account” of “traditional methods of 
 
21. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 214. When 
domestic legislation and procedures fail to ensure these rights, the Court may also declare a violation of Article 
2 (Domestic Legal Effects) of the American Convention. See, e.g., Mayagna (Sumo), supra note 12, at ¶ 155; 
Kuna Indigenous People, supra note 20, at ¶ 157.  
22. E.g., Mayagna (Sumo) , supra note 12, at ¶ 173; Kuna Indigenous People, supra note 20, at ¶ 232. 
23. See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 144 (June 17, 2005); Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 16, at ¶ 
127. 
24. Saramaka People, supra 16, at ¶ 128. Note that the Court has emphasized that “the term ‘survival’ in 
this context signifies much more than physical survival.” It refers to the community’s ability to maintain its 
traditional way of life and its special relationship with its territory. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation 
of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 185, ¶ 37 (Aug. 12, 2008). 
25. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 128. 
26. Id. at ¶ 129. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. In its August 2008 judgment interpreting the Saramaka decision, the Court stated that the studies 
must “conform to the relevant international standards and best practices,” such as the Akwé:Kon Guidelines for 
the Conduct of Cultural, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments. Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
Interpretation of the Judgment, supra  note 24, at ¶ 41. 
29. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 133. 
30. Id. 
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decision-making;” for example, it is the indigenous community, not the State, 
who must decide which person or persons will represent the community in the 
process.31 
While all consultations must have “the objective of reaching an agreement,” 
the Court only requires States to obtain consent in certain circumstances.32 With 
regard to “large-scale development or investment projects that would have a 
major impact” within indigenous territory, States have “a duty not only to 
consult” with the affected community, “but also to obtain [its] free, prior, and 
informed consent [FPIC], according to [its] customs and traditions.”33 The Court 
alternately described such projects as “major development or investment plans 
that may have a profound impact on the property rights of [the community] to a 
large part of their territory.”34 
Saramaka’s standard on FPIC was at the vanguard of international law,35 and 
has proven very influential for international human rights institutions, such as the 
UN Human Rights Committee36 and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.37 The Court’s framework to protect indigenous lands and 
resources is far from perfect,38 of course, and even consent has its limits.39 
 
31. Id. In addition, in the subsequent judgment, Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court expanded the 
applicability of consultation rights, extending them to “any administrative and legislative measures that may 
affect [indigenous and tribal] rights.” Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 166 (June 27, 2012). The Sarayaku Court even 
regarded the right to consultation as a “general principle of international law.” Id. at ¶ 164. 
32. Kichwa Indigenous People, supra note 31. 
33. Id. at ¶ 134 (emphasis added). 
34. Id. at ¶ 137. 
35. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples established consent as the 
“objective” of consultations, but only expressly required consent in a couple of drastic scenarios: when the 
project will result in a community’s “relocation” from its traditional lands, and in situations involving the 
storage or disposal of toxic waste within territories. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, art. 10, 29(2) U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 Sept. 13, 2007. 
36. See Poma Poma v. Peru, Commc’n No. 1457/2006, U.N. Human Rights Committee, ¶7.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/ (2009) (holding, in part: “The Committee considers that participation in the decision-
making process must be effective, which requires not mere consultation but the free, prior and informed consent 
of the members of the community”). 
37. See African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on a Human Rights-Based Approach 
to Natural Resources Governance, 51st Sess., Res. 224 (2012), available at http://www.achpr. 
org/sessions/51st/resolutions/224 (“[A]ll necessary measures must be taken by the State to ensure participation, 
including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision making related to natural resources 
governance”); Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) v. Kenya, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 
No. 276/2003, para. 291 (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/46th/comunications/ 
276.03/achpr46_276_03_eng.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (holding that with 
respect to “any development or investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois 
territory, the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain their free, prior, and 
informed consent, according to their customs and traditions”). 
38. See Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the Inter-
American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 170 (2013) (explaining how there are many opportunities for States 
to exploit the Court’s safeguards). 
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Nevertheless, FPIC is an important means to safeguard indigenous rights, and it 
clearly must apply to the Nicaraguan Canal initiative. 
III. PLANS FOR THE CANAL AND NICARAGUA’S INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
As stated above, Nicaragua ratified the American Convention; further, it 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction and must follow the Tribunal’s authoritative 
interpretations of Article 21. The bewildering scale of the megaproject easily 
meets the Court’s FPIC standard: “large-scale development or investment 
projects that would have a major impact” on indigenous lands.40 As a result, the 
affected communities must provide their free, prior, and informed consent before 
the initiative can proceed. 
In 2013, President Daniel Ortega pushed a bill through Congress, with little 
debate and no bidding process, which granted a fifty-year, renewable concession 
to Wang Jing and his corporation, the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development 
Investment Company (HKND).41 The Canal, according to HKND, will be three 
times as long (178 miles) and almost twice as deep (ninety-two feet) as the 
Panama Canal.42 HKND also intends to build new seaports, railways, highways, 
an oil pipeline, and tourist resorts, among other developments.43 
Ortega’s government granted HKND powers to expropriate land along the 
planned route, which could affect thousands of Nicaraguan property owners.44 A 
significant portion of the announced route intrudes upon the communal lands of 
indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities in Nicaragua.45 This includes the 
autonomous territories of the Creoles and the indigenous Sumo and Rama 
groups. The displacement could cause dire social, cultural, and economic 
consequences for the communities. For example, if the Rama people of 
 
39. For example, a small-scale operation that destroys a sacred site could devastate a community, yet it 
would not likely require consent by the Court. See Jo Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A 
Critique of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51, 98 (2009).  
40. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 134. 
41. See, e.g., Jon Lee Anderson, Breaking Ground on the Nicaragua Canal, NEW YORKER (Jan. 2, 2015), 
available at http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/breaking-ground-nicaragua-canal (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review); Chris Kraul, Nicaragua Canal: A Giant Project with Huge 
Environmental Costs, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 5, 2015), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/nicaragua_canal_a_ 
giant_project_with_huge_environmental_costs/2871 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
42. See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, Land of Opportunity—and Fear—Along Route of Nicaragua’s Giant New 
Canal, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/20/-sp-nicaragua-
canal-land-opportunity-fear-route (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
43. See Anderson, supra note 41; HKND Entrega Estudio de Impacto Ambiental y Social, LA PRENSA 
(June 1, 2015),  http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2015/06/01/nacionales/1842373-hknd-entrega-estudio-de-impacto-
ambiental-y-social (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
44. Id.  
45. Advocates have estimated that fifty-two percent of the announced route intrudes upon the communal 
lands of indigenous and Afro-Caribbean communities.   
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Nicaragua—the last speakers of the Rama language—are dispersed, their 
language could be silenced forever.46 
In addition, scientists and environmental experts have expressed alarm about 
the megaproject’s threat to nature and wildlife. The planned route slices through 
wetlands, nature reserves, and rainforests. Lake Nicaragua, Central America’s 
largest body of freshwater, faces particular danger: one third of the Canal could 
traverse the lake, which would need to be dredged extensively.47 The digging 
could contaminate the water—a key source of drinking water for the country—
and threaten indigenous fish and other species.48 
Biologists Jorge Huete-Pérez and Axel Meyer wrote that the Canal would 
cause nothing less than “an environmental disaster in Nicaragua and beyond.”49 
They stated that the project would likely “destroy around 400,000 hectares of 
rainforests and wetlands,” including “some of the most fragile, pristine and 
scientifically important marine, terrestrial and lacustrine ecosystems in Central 
America.”50  
Some communities that rely on these territories for their livelihood have 
protested that their consent was never sought for the Canal—nor were they ever 
“actively consulted in good faith,” as required by international law.51 To the 
contrary, HKND delegations have crossed into communal lands, and left 
signposts and other markings of the Canal’s planned route, without any 
explanation at all.52 In other cases, information was hastily presented without an 
opportunity for meaningful exchange; there are also reports that Ortega’s 
government has attempted to coerce or bribe certain community members to 
obtain their acquiescence.53 
Finally, as held in Saramaka People, States cannot grant concessions until 
environmental and social impacts have been fully evaluated.54 HKND hired the 
firm Environmental Resources Management (ERM) to conduct impact 
assessments; on May 31, 2015, HKND delivered the ERM report to the 
 
46. See Kate Kilpatrick, Canal ‘Will Destroy We,’ AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Apr. 9, 2015), http://projects. 
aljazeera.com/2015/04/nicaragua-canal/displaced.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
47. Kraul, supra note 41; Scientists Question Rush to Build Nicaragua Canal, PHYS.ORG (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://phys.org/news/2015-03-scientists-nicaragua-canal.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
48. Kraul, supra note 41. 
49. Jorge Huete-Pérez & Axel Meyer, Conservation: Nicaragua Canal Could Wreak Environmental 
Ruin, NATURE INT’L WEEKLY J. SCI. (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.nature.com/news/conservation-nicaragua-
canal-could-wreak-environmental-ruin-1.14721. Huete-Pérez is a past president of the Nicaraguan Academy of 
Sciences. Id.  
50. Id. 
51. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 133. 
52. Kilpatrick, supra note 46. 
53. Id.;  see also Roy Moncada, Indígenas de Nicaragua Resisten Presión del Gobierno por el Canal, LA 
PRENSA (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2016/02/08/nacionales/1982372-indigenas-nicaragua-
resisten-presion-del-gobierno-canal (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
54. Saramaka People, supra note 16, at ¶ 129. 
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Nicaraguan government.55 In this way, Nicaragua granted the full concession and 
allowed nearly six months of work on the megaproject before the completion of 
any substantial impact studies.56 
IV. CONCLUSION 
All potential impacts and benefits resulting from the Canal initiative must be 
fully discussed with the owners of these communal lands—following the above 
Inter-American parameters closely. If the communities decide to reject the 
proposal, it is their right to do so under Article 21 of the American Convention, 
in recognition of their distinctive relationship to their territories and resources. To 
conclude, Nicaragua is the poorest nation in the Americas, after Haiti.  Clearly, 
Ortega’s government must pursue opportunities to reduce poverty and strengthen 
the national economy. However, it cannot do so without fully democratic 
processes, inclusive multicultural policies, and a strict adherence to its 
international and national legal obligations. 
 
55. HKND Entrega a Nicaragua el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental del Gran Canal, EL NUEVO DIARIO 
(June 1, 2015), http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/361307-hknd-entrega-nicaragua-impacto-ambient 
al-gran-cana/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
56. Of course, more objections could be made against the recent studies: they were finished too quickly 
and they lacked indigenous/Afro-Caribbean participation, among others. 
